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Genocide in Rwanda: 
Documentation of Two Massacres 
during April 1994 
November 1994 
This report is based on a U.S. Committee for Refugees site visit to Rwanda in August-September 
1994. The documentation was gathered, and this report was written, by David Hawk, an expert on 
documentation of genocide. Hawk is former U.S. Executive Director of Amnesty International, 
and Associate of the Center for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University. He has had 
years of experience documenting Khmer Rouge massacres of civilians in Cambodia, and has led 
efforts to bring those responsible to justice. He was assisted by Joan Kakwinzere, professor of 
history at Makerere University, a human rights professional, and long-term member of Uganda's 
Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Abuse. 
This report was edited by Virginia Hamilton and produced by Koula Papanicolas of the U.S. 
Commitee for Refugees. 

Preface 
How do you massacre a million people in three weeks? Rwanda gives a real life answer. 
Those in authority plan and oversee. Those in the ranks butcher. Both together are guilty of ana-
tionwide matrix of nearly simultaneous local Hutu actions to extenninate their Thtsi neighbors and 
compatriots in April1994. 
I saw the results of genocide up close, in nwnerous locations such as Nyamata and Musaza 
I've seen a lot in my professional life; I've never seen anything that remotely looks like this. 
The UN, the United States, the entire world failed Rwanda and Rwandans in their most fate-
ful hour. To this very moment, many continue to whitewash what happened in the most effective 
genocide since the Holocaust. To this very moment, the world stands back from the victims and sur-
vivors while pouring aid into the hands of refugee camp leaders who are the criminal perpetrators of 
genocide, pledged to return to Rwanda to finish the job. 
The international machinery for holding at least some accountable, to break the cycle of 
impunity that has infected Rwanda, is now beginning to creak into operation. The jury is still out on 
the seriousness of the effort. In the world's eyes, Rwanda is not a very important place. 
This report attempts in a small way to summarize the dynamics of genocide in two specific 
locations. It names names. It is illustrative of the kind of documentation that needs to be produced 
at sites all over Rwanda. It is the only way to retain an accurate moral compass, to clarify the vic-
tims and the victimizers. 
Every young soldier in Rwanda's new anny has seen the genocide up close. Most have lost 
all or most of their own families. If there is ever to be a coherent Rwanda again, this kind of docu-
mentation must be acted on, and all those found guilty punished. If this does not happen soon, vigi-
lante justice will reign, repatriation of the innocent will be impossible, and additional, perhaps re-
gional, war will be inevitable. 
Roger P. Wmter, Director 
U.S. Committee for Refugees 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) has 
long monitored the situation of Rwandan refu-
gees and reported on the explosive political siru-
ation in Rwanda that threatened even larger 
refugee outflows.1 Following the post-April 6 
eruption of massive and systematic massacres 
against the Thtsi ettmic minority in Rwanda, USCR 
published a series of advocacy Action Alerts on the 
Rwanda crisis. 
The second Action Alert, on June 27, 
1994, stressed the importance of imposing ac-
countability for the massacres. That Alert noted 
that "thorough documentation of the atrocities 
in Rwanda is required to begin the difficult pro-
cess of healing Rwandan society and to educate 
the world that genocide occurred while the 
world watched." That report warned that ''fail-
ure to impose accountability in a public manner 
will allow many culpable military, political, and 
militia leaders to escape and will send a danger-
ous signal worldwide-particularly to Burundi, 
where the potential for organized violence re-
mains high" and recommended that the "inter-
national community should accelerate efforts to 
document the massacres and identify the main 
planners and leaders of the killings in order to 
bring them to justice." 
Subsequent USCR testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcom-
mittee on African Affairs again stressed the ur-
gency of documenting the Rwandan genocide in 
order to bring guilty individuals to justice and 
send a warning that such acts will be punished 
by the world community. That testimony noted 
Administration support for a tribunal to pros-
ecute the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda, 
and urged U.S. officials to assist this process by 
providing immediate diplomatic, financial, and 
logistical support to human rights investigators.2 
To contribute to international account-
ability for those responsible for the Rwandan 
genocide, USCR sent two human rights experts 
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to Rwanda in August and September to under-
take an in depth documentation of two massacre 
sites and to assess the adequacy of measures be-
ing taken to monitor human rights and initiate 
legal proceedings at the international level for 
those responsible for the Rwanda genocide and 
other grave violations of international humani-
tarian law. 
The main difficulty encountered by 
USCR researchers was in deciding which victim 
and survivor accounts to record. The killings 
took place throughout the country and every-
where there were witnesses and/or suiVivors. 
Behind the front-lines in the civil war between 
the Rwandan government and the rebel 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), political kill-
ings and massive slaughters against members of 
Rwanda Tutsi ethnic minority were carried out 
by anny units, civilian police, and mobs or mili-
tia organized by the government These killings 
took place in neighbmhoods throughout 
Rwanda, as government-directed militiamen at-
tacked the homes of Tutsi residents. Killings 
took place at police- and militia-manned road-
side checkpoints where ethnicity-specific, state-
issued identity cards were used to identify mi-
nority groups members. Larger scale massacres 
took place at public buildings (churches, stadi-
ums, hotels) to which the Tutsi had fled in hopes 
of finding safety and protection. This USCR re-
port describes the sequence of events at two dif-
ferent churches, chosen virtually at random, to 
which neighborhood Tutsi had sought sanctu-
ary: one in the capital of Kigali and another in a 
rural area in eastern Rwanda 
These investigations were conducted 
under difficult logistical circumstances. Neither 
the capital city of Kigali nor the provincial 
towns or villages visited by USCR had electric-
ity, telephones, or running water. Securing 
transportation, finding food, were time consum-
ing and remarkably expensive. Once the inves-

tigators located the survivor of a particular mas-
sacre, he or she would identify another wimess 
who could be interviewed. But it took days, and 
often several trips, to track down and locate that 
wimess. 
All wimesses were interviewed sepa-
rately. Other than examining the consistency of 
multiple sources of information for the same 
event, USCR investigators had no way to verify 
independently the information provided by the 
survivors and eye wimesses interviewed. Nor 
was our purpose to undertake the kind of in-
vestigations required of a national or interna-
tional prosecutor. The massacres we are re-
porting on will undoubtedly appear as 
one-line or one-sentences items, along with 
hundreds of other massacres, in official account-
ings of the Rwandan genocide 
Our purpose, rather, is to publish the 
stories these survivors, none of whom spoke En-
glish, told us. Their narratives show that these 
killings were conducted openly, in broad day-
light, by Rwandans who had been organized by 
the State to kill their neighbors. As a result, we 
have frequently included the names of perpetra-
tors recognized and identified by their intended 
victims. 
This report describes the measures cur-
rently underway to brwg remedy and redress for 
these terrible crimes, and the still urgent neces-
sity for ongoing monitoring of the human rights 
situation in Rwanda-one of the measures nec-
essary to enable the vast numbers of new 
Rwandan refugees to return home. 
Victims of the massacre at Gahini, a jew miles from Rukara parish, where the USCR team did 
documentation. The photograph was taken only days after the massacre. 
Photo: Father Oswald Rudakemwa 
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Gikondo 
demonstrates the 
determination of 
the perpetrators 
to thoroughly 
eliminate the 
targeted minority 
group. 
I. THE APRIL MASSACRES IN A Survivor's Account 
GIKONDOCHURCH,KIGALI ~~~~~~-------------
The June 28, 1994, Report of the UN Commis-
sion on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on 
Rwanda, Mr. Degni-Sequi, cited a massacre out-
side the parish church at Gikondo, an industrial 
section of the capital of Kigali, where ''the street 
was covered with corpses the length of a kilo-
meter."3 
Those bodies were the results of the 
killings of Thtsi residing in several "hills;' also 
called "cells" (cellules)4 that comprise the 
Gikondo "sector" of one of the three "com-
munes" that make up Rwanda's capital city of 
KigaJi According to the testimony of survi-
vors at Gikondo, the killings were committed by 
politically organized mobs operating under the 
direction of an elite military unit of the anned 
forces of the former Rwandan government 
called the Presidential Guard. 
Near the crest of the hill, next to the 
road cited by the UN Special Rapporteur as 
having been littered with corpses, is a barbed 
wire fence with several metal gates enclosing 
an ecclesiastical "mission station" run by the 
Pallotine missionary order of the Catholic 
church. The Pallotine mission, staffed by a 
dozen Polish priests and nuns, is a small, 
self-contained campus with a large church 
capable of holding up to 2,000 thousand wor-
shipers, a small chapel suitable for private 
prayers, a cultural or community center, a 
large print shop with an adjoining warehouse, 
an administrative building, and several sepa-
rate housing quarters for resident priests and 
nuns. 
The following is an account of the 
massacre inside the mission. This massacre, 
while small compared with the more extensive 
killings in the general neighborhood, is a par-
ticulariy appropriate and useful potential body 
of evidence in the event of national or interna-
tional legal proceedings against those respon-
sible for these killings. Gikondo demonstrates 
the determination of the perpetrators to thor-
oughly eliminate the targeted minority group. 
Further, the easily attainable evidence includes 
Rwandan survivor accounts, UN and other for-
eign eyewitness accounts, photographs of some 
of the wounded and dead taken by a UN eyewit-
ness, and an on-site mass grave. 
According to Mr. Emmanuel Musonera, a 37-
year-old Thtsi, one of the two known survivors 
of the massacre inside the church, the situation 
in Gikondo sector was already tense prior to the 
April 6 plane crash that killed Rwandan Presi-
dent Habyarimana. Several weeks earlier, there 
had been random killings of Tutsi in Gikondo 
following the assassination of M. Bucyana, a 
leader of the extremist Hutu political party, the 
Coalition for the Defense of the Republic 
(CDR). 
Following the airplane crash of April 6, 
Musonera, who was residing with his family in 
Kigarama cell, one of the hills in Gikondo sec-
tor, heard shootings all night long, but he did not 
yet know what was going on. The following 
morning, April 7, Musonera saw several Presi-
dential Guards in his neighborhood. He asked 
an officer what was happening. The officer re-
plied that he didn't know either, but told 
Musonera to wait there. A corporal in the Presi-
dential Guard, not knowing Musonera 's 
ethnicity, told him that it was time to kill Thtsi. 5 
A military taxi arrived and took the sol-
diers away. But as the Presidential Guards de-
parted, a mob of Impusamugmi militiamen6 ar-
rived in his neighborhood, evidently knowing 
which residents were Tutsi. Musonera saw the 
mob attack and kill a Tutsi neighbor named 
GeiVais and his family. So Musonera and his 
family quickly hid nearby in a primary school 
ooinpound, from where he could obseiVe a group 
of Impusamugmi enter and ransack his home. 
After the mob left, Musonera and his 
family emerged from hiding. He pretended that 
his child was sick, and set off to seek shelter and 
protection at the Gikondo church. He passed 
numerous roadblocks manned by gendarmes, 
the local police force, along the way. Not rec-
ognizable as a Tutsi, he was able to convince the 
police that he was taking his sick child to the 
Gikondo mission infirmary. When he arrived at 
the church, late morning on Thursday, April 7, 
several score of Tutsi from Gikondo sector were 
already there. More would come during the 
next two days. Several hundred Thtsi were shel-
tered in various buildings on the church 
grounds, some more securely hidden in "crawl 
spaces" beneath floors or roofs, others more 
simply, inside various buildings . 
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Emmanuel Musonera, one of two known survivors of the massacre in Gikondo Church, Kigali 
Photo: USCRID. Hawk 
On Saturday, April9, around 9:00a.m., 
the priests asked the approximately 500 Tutsi 
gathered in the compound--many, if not most of 
whom were regular or frequent congregates or 
worshipers at this church--to gather in the main 
chapel for a worship sexvice. During the mass, 
the worshipers heard shootings, grenade explo-
sions, and a commotion outside the church. 
These were probably the killings of sector resi-
dents who had been rounded up from the neigh-
borhood and brought to the road outside the 
church grounds for execution and whose bodies 
were obsexved the next day "littering the street" 
After the mass, the worshipers re-
mained inside the church. 7 The next thing they 
knew, four officers (two Presidential Guard and 
two local police) entered the church, followed 
by some hundred or more Interhamwe militia-
men8 anned with machetes and clubs. The mili-
tiamen began slashing away--hacking at the 
anns, legs, genitals, breasts, faces and necks--at 
the unarmed, terrorized and panic-stricken wor-
shipers trapped inside the church. Some were 
killed inside the church. Others were dragged 
outside and beaten to death in the small court-
yard in front of the church. In the confusion and 
melee of the bloodletting, an unquantifiable 
number of the Tutsi were also able to run out of 
the church and hide elsewhere on the church 
compound. The murders went on for two hours, 
. as the militiamen circulated among the 
wounded to finish them off. 
Musonera was robbed of his money 
and shoes, then slashed on his ear, face, and 
head. The deep cut across his mouth and cheek 
bled profusely. At first, he feigned death. Later, 
he was able to run outside and hide behind some 
bushes across from the entrance to the church. 
From their unifonns, he could identify two of 
the officers as Presidential guards and two local 
police. 
Musonera also recognized several of 
the killers. The mob was lead by Jean 
Ntawutagirpfa, also known as "Congolais," the 
head of the Gikondo sector lnterhamwe. 
Musonera also recognized Bernard Rwajekare, 
whom he knew to be a CDR member, and 
Alphonse Kakizimana, a Hutu who had come 
from Byumba and who had worked as a gar-
dener at Gikondo church. 
Eyewibtess and Corroborating Accounts 
Some of the kiliings described by Musonera were 
witnessed by two officers of the UN peacekeeping 
operation for Rwanda, Major Jerzy Macza and 
Major Chudy Ryszard.9 To share the company of 
Several hundred 
Tutsiwere 
sheltered in 
various buildings 
on the church 
grounds, some 
more securely 
hidden in "crawl 
spaces" beneath 
floors or roofs, 
others more 
simply, inside 
various buildings. 
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Based on his own 
observations, 
Maczka saw clear 
cooperation and, in 
fact, a division of 
labor between the 
local police and the 
militia in the 
Gikondo church. 
The police searched 
for the Tutsi and 
used their authority 
to gain entrance and 
open the door for the 
mobs who did the 
actual killing. 
The court yard and front door of the church at Gikondo. This is the location where Major 
Maczka observed killings. Photo: USCRID. Hawk 
the Polish priests and nuns at the Gikondo mission, 
the two Polish UNAMIR officers resided at the 
chw:-ch while off duty. Coincidentally, they were 
on the church grounds when the killings began, 
and they saw some of what happened before they 
were ordered to leave the church grounds and 
return to UNAMIR headquarters on April 10. 
Also present, . of course, were the for-
eign priest and nuns, the members of the 
Pallotine religious order, who ran the mission 
complex at Gikondo. Following yet another 
massacre at Gikondo church on April 12, 
UNAMIR came with armored personnel carri-
ers and evacuated the Pallotines on April 13. 
Father Filipek Stanislas, one of the priests 
present during the killings onApril9, organized 
the digging of the mass grave on April 10, and 
was also on the church grounds during the sub-
sequent April 12 killings at the Chapel. By the 
time of the USCR mission to Rwanda in Au-
gust, Father Stanislas had returned to Kigali. 
While he did not personally see the actual mur-
ders themselves, his testimony amplifies, in im-
portant ways, the accounts of Major Maczka 
and Emmanuel Musonera.10 
According to Father Stanislas, on the 
morning of April 9, a group of local police first 
entered the church grounds.. They killed a per-
son at the door of the church, claiming that the 
person had a grenade. The priest came over to 
talk to the local police, who claimed further that 
the church and church grounds were harboring 
Inkotanyi, Tutsi supporters of the Rwanda Patri-
otic Front, and that they had to search for them. 
The priests claimed that those present 
were Christian worshipers, oot the local police 
continued to insist that they search the premises 
and examine the identity papers of the 
Rwandans present at the church. Some of the 
police remained at the main church itself, while 
others left the area directly in Hunt of the 
church. Then the militia appeared, threatened 
and pushed the priests away, entered the church, 
and began the beatings and killings, which Fa-
ther Stanislas said went on for two hours. 
UNAMIR Major Maczka was about 70 
meters from the main church. He saw the local 
police begin to enter the various buildings in the 
mission complex. ffe saw a group of about 60 
militia armed with machetes, clubs, and what 
appeared to be one Kalishnikov climb over the 
fence surrounding the church complex and 
swarm over the area. For 10 or 15 minutes, he 
saw people being pulled out of the church and 
clubbed and slashed in front of the church. 11 
After 15 minutes, the militia came back outside 
the church and clubbed the wounded there to 
death. 
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During the massacres, Major Maczka 
attempted to contact UNAMIR headquarters on 
his walkie-talkie, but because the channels were 
occupied, he could not get through. After the 
carnage, and after the militia and local police 
had withdrawn from the church, Majors Maczka 
and Ryszard helped the priests care for the 
wounded. Maczka had a camera with several 
frames left on the roll of film inside. He photo-
graphed two of the wounded, Musonera, whose 
face was badly gouged and swollen, and another 
woman, Mrs. Theodosie. Several other photo-
graphs showed a score of bodies strewn in front 
of the church. The following day, Major 
Maczka was ordered back to UNAMIR head-
quarters. 
Based on his own obsetvations, Maczka 
saw clear cooperation and, in fact, a division of la-
bor betWeen the local police and the militia in the 
Gikondo church. The police searched for the 
Tutsi and used their authority to gain entrance 
and open the door for the mobs who did the actual 
killing. 
According to Father Stanislas, the mur-
ders were prepared and premeditated. They 
were also vicious and cruel. From the wounds 
on the dead bodies, it was apparent that the ears 
and mouths had been particularly slashed; 
clothes were pulled off and genitals mutilated 
on both men and women. 
The priests tended the wounded and 
helped some of the sUIVivors escape the pre-
mises through a small gate at the back of the 
mission complex away from the front and side 
roads. They tried to persuade the SUIVivors to 
leave because the priests could not protect them. 
Some did. About 20 others did not, preferring 
to continue to hide under floor boards, in crawl 
spaces between ceilings and roofs, and in the 
small, private chapel. 
Musonera was evacuated by Medecins 
Sans Frontiers (MSF) staff, who took him to the 
hospital at Giterama. He again feared for his 
life as they passed several highway road blocks 
manned by lnterhamwe, but MSF managed to 
get him through. 
According to Major Moczka, the Red 
Cross came that afternoon, but said there were 
too many bodies to take them away. The priests 
dug a huge but shallow hole in an area adjacent 
to the courtyard in front of the church and bur-
ied most of the dead. Seventy-seven bodies 
were buried that Saturday, including those of 
eleven children. Father Stanislas also saw gar-
bage trucks pull up outside the church, and pris-
oners from the city jail loading the bodies on the 
road just outside the church. According to Ma-
jor Moczka, another 25 bodies that were found 
at various places on the mission ground were 
buried the next day. Many of the identity cards 
of the dead had been taken by the local police 
when they first entered the church. They were 
strewn about amidst other paper and piles of 
ruble from the carnage. The identity cards were 
not collected again or preserved by the priests. 
There is no way now to determine the names of 
the dead. 
Worse, the killing had not ended. The 
priests tried to persuade the sutvivors of 
Saturday's massacre to leave the mission 
grounds because they were unable to guarantee 
their security. But one mother with children 
said to the priests, "Father, if we must die, let us 
die here." And so they did. Roughly 20 persons 
remained on the mission grounds, 10 or 12 were 
housed in the small, one-room brick chapel, 
about 50 yards from the main church. The 
priests quietly brought food to them during the 
night, hoping no one would know that people 
were still hidden there. But somehow, word got 
out. · According to Father Stanislas, Radio 
RTLM, the extremist radio station run by mem-
bers of fonner President Habyarimana 's politi-
cal party, announced that the church was still 
harboring the lnkotanyi (supporters of the RPF). 
Four days later, on the afternoon of 
April 12, approximately 100 Interhamwe en-
tered the church grounds and demanded the 
keys to the chapel. The metal door to the chapel 
had been locked from the inside, and according 
to Father Stanislas, the priests did not have keys. 
The I nterhamwe tried without success to shoot 
the lock and otheiWise break down the door. 
Failing that, the mob broke the narrow win-
dows, poured gasoline into the roughly 12' by 
12' room, threw in grenades, the explosion of 
which caused fires, burning to death the 10 to 12 
people who had locked themselves inside. 
The mob went through the other build-
ing on the mission ground, and beat seven per-
sons who were found hiding in the building ad-
jacent to the print shop. Four died immediately. 
Three more were heavily wounded. The priests 
brought water and tried to treat their wounds. 
But they died the following morning. 
1be next morning, April 13, lnterhamwe 
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The burnt interior of the little chapel 
at Gikondo where 12 people burned to 
death. 
Photo: USCR/D. Hawk 
also returned. They saw the bloodstained 
clothes on the priest who had treated the 
wounded and threateningly accused the priests 
of sheltering and assisting the Tutsi who were 
supposed to be killed. Angered, the mob set 
fires to cars on the church grounds and began 
ransacking and robbing the health and commu-
nity center, saying that there were still Inkotanyi 
inside. Now fearing for their lives, the priests 
contacted UNAMIR, and at 5:00 p.m., the UN 
peacekeepers evacuated the priests and nuns. 
The church buildings were further damaged by 
warfare when the RPF captured Kigali. Follow-
ing the end of the war, some of the priests re-
turne-d from Poland, and began to reopen the 
mission. In August, when the U.S. Committee 
for Refugees mission initially investigated this 
particular massacre, the acrid stench of death re-
mained, as did some skeletal remains in the 
chapel's antechamber. 
Concluding Note 
In it~ essentials, the Gikondo church massacre 
does not differ from scores of such massacres 
that took place throughout Rwanda in April 
1994, including the one described below at 
Rukara parish. Even so, the April 9-12 killings 
at the Pallotine mission station at Gikondo 
should be a prime case in any international legal 
p~..edings that might be instituted for the 
a Genocide in Rwanda 
Rwandan genocide: first, in making the legal 
case that acts of genocide were comrniu:ed, and 
second, regarding any individual indictments 
that might be brought against the identifiable 
and recognizable leaders of the Gikondo sector 
Interhamwe. (Father Stanislas is certain he 
could recognize some of the Interhamwe leaders 
of the Gikondo sector.) 
At Gikondo, there is an articulate, cred-
ible suiVivor, Mr. Musonera, whose wounds 
were photographed by a UN official. Perllaps, 
with more time, the prosecutors can locate the 
other photographed wounded survivor, Mrs. 
Theodosie. According to Musonera, the daugh-
ter of Charles Karera witnessed and suiVived the 
killings on the road outside the fenC(!. The 
USCR mission of August-September could not 
locate her. But reportedly, she continue:s to re-
side in Gikondo sector, and probably she:: can be 
found and can clarify those events. There were 
the two UNAMIR eyewitnesses, who photo-
graphed some of the wounded and dead within 
hours of the killings. There were an ample 
number of foreign priests and nuns, who did not 
wimess the killings, but who were present on 
the mission grounds during the massacres and 
treated the wounded and buried the dead. Only 
one of these had returned to Kigali at the time of 
the USCR investigation. But the others are easy 
to locate in Poland. Should forensic patholo-
gists need to exhume remains, the mass grave 
exists next to the church. 
Almost certainly there were employ-
ment records of the local police--the gendarmes 
who opened the doors for the militia--for 
Gikondo sector; whether these records can be 
found is an open question. The identifiable kill-
ers are either living elsewhere in Rwanda, per-
haps with an assumed name, or more probably 
in one of the refugee camps outside Rwanda 
stili under the control of the former government. 
Whether indicnnents or arrest warrants could 
ever be drawn up or served is a matter for future 
prosecutors to determine. 
But the murders at Gikondo church are 
clearly genocidal massacres, not simply political 
killings. Like elsewhere in Rwanda, the Tutsi of 
Gikondo sector fled to the church to escape the 
eruption of house to house killings in their 
neighborhoods--thinking they could find 
safety in the religious places where they had 
formerly worshiped with their Hutu neigh-
bors until the killing spree had passed, as had 
previously happened during earlier outbreaks 
of ethnic violence against the Tutsi minority 
group. 
That was not to be the case this time. 
From the testimony of Rwandan survivors and 
foreign eyewitnesses, it is clear that the politi-
cally organized mob that carried out the killings 
(which were not without ritualized and brutal 
mutilation, as well as petty thievery) was work-
ing in concert, indeed guided by, military and 
police agents acting under the authority of the 
Rwandan state. That neither the police initially 
or the I nterhamwe mobs subsequently could be 
dissuaded by the foreign priests from carrying 
out their work shows how clear and firm their 
orders must have been. 
That the Gikondo sector militiamen re-
peatedly returned again to search the premises 
to make sure they had left no Tutsi still alive in-
dicates the intention to destroy in whole, and not 
even in part --literally, to finish off physically--
the ethnically Tutsi residents of that area All of 
this was done in broad daylight, without any at-
tempt whatsoever to disguise the identity of the 
perpetrators, indicating that there was absolutely 
no perceived moral, legal, or political sanction 
against what they were doing. 
The mass grave at Gikondo Church. Photo: USCRID. Hawk 
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In between sprees 
of murder, the 
killers paused to 
chat with their vic-
tims, kill and roast 
the cows the Tutsi 
cattlemen had 
brought with them, 
and regularly 
retreat for rest. 
ll. THE MASSACRES AT RUKARA 
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In contrast to the killings at Gikondo described 
above, the massacres at Rukara, a rural com-
mune and sector in Kibungo Prefecture (prov-
ince) were much larger, more drawn out, and 
more complex--initially irresolute, even haphaz-
ard, yet in the end, even more savage and gro-
tesque. Again, militia attacks on Tutsi in their 
hom,es along the hillsides immediately follow-
ing the downing of President Habyarimana 's 
plane drove several thousand Tutsi, most of 
whom were fanners or cattlemen, to a sprawl-
ing, isolated mission complex on a high plateau 
above one of the fingers of Lake Muhazi. Some 
of the cattle traders brought their small herds 
with them. The Thtsi from Rukara commune 
first encamped, then hid, in a dozen different 
buildings within the church complex, where 
they had previously worshiped and gone to 
school with their Hutu neighbors. On at least 
four occasions, the Hutu Burgrneister (the local 
mayor), sometimes accompanied by the local 
Men1ber of Parliament from this area, came to 
the church to talk to the Tutsi who had sought 
sanctuary there. 
After robbing the homes of the fleeing 
Thtsil, the local lnterhamwe mobs repeatedly 
came to Rukara parish church where they took 
ten days to kill off most of their fonner Tutsi 
neighbors. In between sprees of murder, the 
killers paused to chat with their victims, kill and 
roast the cows the Tutsi cattlemen had brought 
with them, and regularly retreat for rest. The 
mob taunted the richest Tutsi by name as they 
hid inside church buildings, argued over which 
Thtsil, if any, should be spared, and frequently 
left the church compound to get more ammuni-
tion or soldiers to assist them before returning, 
singing and whistling, for another round of 
mass murder. 
The foreign priests and nuns at Rukara 
parish were evacuated a third of the way 
through the April killings. As of August, they 
had not returned except for one visit by the 
fonner head priest, and were not available at the 
time of the USCR mission to provide non-
R wandan corroboration. The slaughter of 
Rukara commune's Tutsi population ended 
when the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) cap-
tured the area on April 16. The bodies of the 
A Genocide in Rwanda 
dead were collected and cremated, reportedly 
inside the church buildings, but not befbre for-
eign journalists had visited the scene and photo-
graphed some of the carnage. But there is now 
no way to verify independently the nurnber of 
deaths. And some elements of this story do not 
entirely hang together. However, the survivor 
accounts are remarkably consistent The execu-
tioners knew many of their victims. .And the 
survivors readily identify those who led lhe kill-
ings and many who participated. Following is a 
summary reconstruction of their accounts. 
Rukara commune12 is located in 
Kibungo prefecture, 13 roughly an hour :and fif-
teen minutes by car due east and slightly north 
of the capital of Kigali. Most of the way, the 
road is paved. But at Lake Muhazi, a laterite 
road goes up a considerable hill, past a large 
hospital complex at Gahini. From there, one 
lane, dirt roads extend deeper into an agricul-
tural plateau. Rukara has a town square with 
detached houses stretching around a green the 
size of a soccer field. But like the rest of 
R wan<ll4 there are not what people ofien con-
sider to be rural villages, a cluster of huts or 
houses centering around a church or school or 
public building. As in the rest of Rwanda, the 
Rukara commune is composed of cellules 
(cells), in reality, one among many rolling 
"hills" on which houses are scattered., sur-
rounded by very small plots of land for famrlng 
(mostly bananas and beans) or small plots of grass 
or scrub land suitable for grazing small herds of 
cattle. People get around mostly on foot or by bi-
cycle, with occasional cars or pick-up trucks. 
Ten or fifteen minutes by car firom the 
hospital complex at Gahini is exactly what one 
might visualize as a European mission station in 
central Africa: Paroisse, or Parish, Rukara. The 
unenclosed mission stretches along a road, per-
haps a half-mile in length, perpendicular to two 
other roads. At the intersection of one of the 
petpendicular roads there are quarters for the 
nuns and a cemetery. At the other end, there is a 
dispensary, or medical facility. Along tne road 
that runs in between, there are several school 
buildings, a three-room maternity facility, a 
church and adjoining office building, a nearby 
one-room building used as a recreation room, 
and several other scattered buildings. Behind 
the recreation hall, is a small rabbit hutch. 
According to Sister Veneranda 
Murekatete, a thirty-year-old Rwandan who was 
Bodies outside ofRukllraparish. Photo: Cathy Watson 
born at Rukara and who spent four years as a 
nun at Rukara Parish, the mission complex was 
run by the Spanish-based Missionary Order of 
the Sacred Heart of Jesus and Mary. The chief 
priests were Father Santos and Father Melchior. 
The head nuns were Sister Maria-Louisa Ariaga 
and Sister Terese Canavese. The Spanish nuns 
and priests were evacuated to Barcelona, but 
Sister Veneranda believes that some of them 
may now be in the refugee camps in Zaire or 
Tanzania. 
The Trouble Starts 
Mr. Gerald Gasherebuka, a 54-year-old Tutsi 
school teacher who had been living in Rukara 
for 27 years, says that the Hutu and Tutsi had 
lived together in that area "without problems." 
Before December 1993, people lived amicably 
and "shared beer." After that, though, he no-
ticed Hutu youth withdrawing, drinking beer by 
themselves. Some of the youth wings of the 
Hutu political parties were learning how to 
shoot, and separated themselves from others in 
the community. And in March, a Hutu friend 
named Rukul asked him, oddly he thought, if 
the Tutsi of Muzizi cell were planning to kill the 
Hutu of Kinunga cell. 
Others were more suspicious. Andrew 
Kabarira, a Tutsi, moved back to Rukara in 
early March 1994 because political unrest in 
Kigali had resulted in the closing of the factory 
where he worked. But it wasn't secure in 
Rukara either. According to Kabarira, the youth 
wings of the MNRD and the CDR had come 
into Rukara by bus to hold political rallies 
where they would speak against the Thtsi and 
against the moderate Hutu political opposition 
such as the Liberal Party and the Social Demo-
cratic Party. After these rallies, the youth would 
rough up some Tutsi (including himself, 
Kabarira relates) and other Hutu whom they 
would see wearing the distinctive hats of the op-
position parties. 
Sister Veneranda also expected trouble. 
Ever since the political parties began, she had 
noticed Hutu beginning to keep a distance from 
their fonner Tutsi friends. There was munnur-
ing about the killing of Tutsi. Sister Veneranda 
now believes that the Hutu had been infonned 
that they would have to kill the Tutsi, but they 
didn't know when. Indeed, some Hutu would 
openly say that "the government had delayed 
giving the orders to kill the Tutsi." But, accord-
ing to her, "the Thtsi didn't believe" that there 
could be such orders. 
Sometime around April 6 or 7, some-
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body gave the orders. The murderous sewch for 
Thtsi in Ruara commune began the day follow-
ing the attack on President Habyarimana 's 
plane. That day, a Hutu police officer in Rukara 
told nurse Immaculate Muakmurigo that the at-
tack on the plane never would have happened if 
they had finished off the Thtsi earlier. And as 
elsewhere in Rwanda, it began with militiamen 
of the two ruling Hutu extremist parties sc:~h­
ing through the neighborhoods, looking for 
Tutsi in their homes. On Wednesday nigh1t, An-
drew Kabarira saw smoke and fires on the hill-
sides in the direction of Murambi. Mid-day on 
Thursday, April 7, Kabarira saw two of his 
neighbors at Mitundo cell, Mr. Senturo Viateur 
and a Mr. Nkeramugaba, killed by a group of 
alx>Ut 30 militiamen.14 Kabarira told his wife 
and children to run to Rukara parish, two or 
three kilometers away, while he packed some 
clothes. When he started to leave, he saw that 
his neighborhood was sunounded by militia-
men, so he hid in thick bushes near his home. 
From there, he could see the militiamen who 
killed his neighbors, and other bands of n1ilitia 
looting and taking the metal roofs off of houses 
frorr.t which Tutsi had fled. His neighbors took 
off his roof and doors, then knocked his house 
down. (After Kibirira hid for two days in these 
bushes, a friendly Responsible--the title of the 
leadilng local public official for a cell--Mr. 
Gakwisi of Buyonza cell, saw him, gave him 
water, and urged him to go to Rukara parish at 
5:00 am. the next day, where he was able to re-
join his family.) 
On Thursday, the day after the plane 
crash, Mr. John Mari-Vienney Butera, a 41-
yea.r--old cattle herdsman, saw people, including 
wounded people, fleeing from the direction of 
Mirnmbe. These people told him that Thtsi had 
been attacked all night long. Butera feared the 
pattern of killing would reach his house. He 
wanted to flee to the forests, but was afraid that 
Interhamwe had the roads to the forests covered. 
So he went to Rukara parish, bringing his cattle 
wilth him, as others did. Ms. Angelique Jolie 
U1nurungi, a 22-year-old, lived only a kilorneter 
from the chun;h. On Thursday, April 7, around 
5:00 p.m., she saw a group of militia headed in 
the direction of her house, so she hid all night in 
the bushes. On Friday, she ran to the parish rec-
reation room, where she had often gone before 
to watch videos. Another 22-year-old, Ms. 
Otantal Kayisinga went to the maternity ward 
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because her aunt was a midwife there. 
Other swvivors described their flight to 
the parish on Friday. Mr. Gerald Gashebebuka 
says the killings started at Gahini sector on 
April 7. On Friday, April 8, many Thtsi from 
Rukara sector and Kawangire sector arrived at 
Rukara parish. He also saw people coming 
from Rwinkuba cell, where he could see houses 
burning. On Friday, Sister Veneranda took a 
parish car and traveled to her family's house in 
Rukara. Her Thtsi neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. 
Manuel and their five children, had been killed. 
So Sister Veneranda took her own family back to 
the parish, where she put them in the maternity 
ward. Nurse Immaculee Rukamurigo was al-
ready at the parish dispensary. On Friday after-
noon, she was already treating the wounded 
transfening the worst cases to the hospital a~ 
Gahini. Her family joined her at Rukara parish, 
as large numbers of others began to arrive as 
well. 
Many of the Tutsi who came to Rukara 
parish were worshipers there. Others were Protes-
tants. And ~some, according to Sister Veneranda, 
were nonworshipers. Irrespective of what was 
happening in the cells and sectors from which 
they had fled, by all accounts, they thought they 
would be safe at the church. The Thtsi from 
around Rukara commune camped out around 
the sprawling mission station. They e:en 
thought that the responsible Rwandan officials 
for the commune would provide for their pro-
tection. Nonetheless, sensing themselves to be 
several thousand in number, some of the men 
vowed they would resist, should the I nterhamwe 
come there to attack them. 
The most immediate concern of some 
of those present was the well-being of the sev-
eral hundred or more cattle that some of the 
Thtsi had brought with them. The cows had not 
been watered or fed, and were becoming rest-
less and noisy. Reportedly, the Burgmeister, the 
highest commune level official, had already 
come to Rukara parish on Friday. They asked 
him about water for their cattle, but he belittled 
their concern. ''The question of the cows is no 
question at all," he told them. That was cer-
tain! y the case, as the course of events unfolded. 
A band of Interhamwe militia came to 
Rukara parish between 2:00p.m. and 3:00p.m. 
on Saturday afternoon. The Tutsi men, some 
carrying the spears and clubs they had brought 
with them, came out of the buildings on the 
road, stood their ground, and faced off the mili-
tia The militiamen retreated--or, rather, they 
left to get weapons, and came back in larger 
number around 5:00p.m., this time with gre-
nades in hand. Using their grenades, the 
Interhamwe attacked, killing eleven. They 
drove the Tutsi defenders into the church build-
ings. According to Gasherebuka, those who 
threw the grenades included Paul Mujyambere 
and John Bosco Rukundo. 
The militia then drove away the cattle. 
According to virtually all the survivor accounts, 
the Interhamwe then feasted for two days on the 
Thtsi 's cows, 15 and did not return to the parish 
grounds on Sunday or Monday. During this 
time, Father Santos and others present at the 
parish, including Andrew Kabarira, buried 
the eleven in the cemetery at the mission 
complex. 
Nothing happened during the day on 
Monday, other than consultations between Fa-
ther Santos and the Burgmeister at the Bukara 
commune headquarters. In any event, those at 
the Parish related that Father Santos came and 
told them that the Burgmeister had said he 
would send police to guard the people at the 
parish. A policeman did come around 3:00p.m. 
to deliver a message that people should go home 
and that nothing would happen to them. But 
Andrew Kabarira, a survivor of the RJl]aua 
parish massacres. Photo: USCRID. Hawk 
they were not convinced, and preferred to re-
main at the parish. 
Around 6:00 p.m., a larg~ group of 
Interhamwe came and attacked them, again us-
ing grenades, and again forcing people to retreat 
inside the church buildings. Those at the church 
itself barricaded the doors and windows so that 
the I nterhamwe could not get in. According to 
Kabarira, a pick-up truck belonging to the com-
mune and driven by a Member of Parliament, 
Mr. Karibwende, delivered a truck load of 
stones. The Interhamwe managed to break 
some of the church windows and attempted 
throughout the night to throw stones and gre-
nades through the broken windows. The attacks 
continued until dawn. Those inside the church 
counted 35 dead, mostly from the grenades 
tossed in through the small openings in the bro-
ken windows. At daybreak, the Interhamwe 
shouted out that, after getting some rest, they 
would come back to finish the attack. 
Those inside the church buildings came 
outside and tried to cook breakfast for the chil-
dren. Early Tuesday morning, a distraught Fa-
ther Santos went to see the Prefect (the equiva-
lent of a governor) at Kibungo, not to return 
until months later. According to Sister 
Veneranda, Father Santos was overwhelmed be-
cause some of his most important parishioners--
catechists, choir members, lay officials--were 
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killing their neighbors and follller fellow-wor-
shipers at his, and their, church. 16 
The Interhamwe did return at around 
11 :00 a.m. and, true to their word, renewc~ the 
attack, which continued sporadically until late 
tltat afternoon. The dead inside the church, 
mostly killed by exploding grenades, were now 
so many that the swvivors stopped counting. 
And at that point, those who had barricaded them-
selves inside tlhe main church lost contact witth the 
other groups of people around the parish. 
Late Tuesday afternoon, the Bwg1neister 
returned to the parish, accompanied by govennnent 
soldiers. He tried to convince those barricaded 
inside the church building and recreation hall 
that the had no authority or control over the 
Interhamwe. He told people to leave and find 
other places for their security. No ·one believed 
hilm, and the hidden people called out to him to 
provide for their protection The Burgm.eister 
left All of the swvivors from Rukara inter-
viewed by USCR were convinced that the 
Burgmeister and government soldiers were 
worldng hand. in hand with, and in fact were di-
recting, the lnterhamwe militiamen. 
Early Thesday evening, the militia re-
turned, but this time concentrated on the recre-
ation hall just down the road, where they com-
mitW..d a terrible massacre. But that was not 
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quick or easy either. Like the main church, the 
recreation building was a one-story, brick struc-
ture with a few small windows and a small 
metal door. The militia pried away a portion of 
the metal sheet roofing. They threw in gre-
nades, killing many inside. On the outside, they 
continued to try to break the door. In the middle 
of the night, they succeeded in breaking through 
the bricks on one side of tht: door frame, 17 and 
thus were able to open the door. According to 
Ms. Angelique Umurungi 's testimony, about 30 
lnterhamwe entered the room and proceeded to 
slaughter nearly one thousand persons, while 
those outside shouted the names of those who 
should be killed--mostly the wealthier Tutsi. 
Because of the grenades exploding in-
side the enclosed space, those hiding inside 
were too terrified to react, according to Ms. 
Umurgungi. The killers moved about, hacking 
and beating people to death. They then poured 
gasoline about and started fires. Those who 
then tried to run outside through the now open 
door to escape the fires were killed outside. 
r:~~gi claims that of a thousand persons 
hiding m the recreation building, only ten sur-
vived: those who, like herself, had smeared 
themselves with blood and crawled under 
corpses. 
One thousand is a very approximate 
round number. If there were that many in the 
recreation room, it was extremely crowded. But 
much more important in telllls of evidence of 
genocide, and far worse than the actual number, 
w~tever it was, is the mutilation that Angelique 
testifies to have personally witnessed: her 
mother's head beaten so savagely it came off her 
neck, after which her killers-a Mr. Rukundo 
and a Mr. Minani--kicked the decapitated head 
remarking that the woman had not even cried 
out. 
After spending much of Monday night 
attacking the main church building, renewing 
the fight there on Tuesday during the day, and 
attacking the recreation hall throughout much of 
Tuesday night, on Wednesday the Interhamwe 
moved to the other end of the mission complex 
and attacked the small maternity ward, where 
Ms. Olanta! Kayisinga, the 22-year-old student 
at Kayonza, had been hiding with her extended 
family since April 7. After the arduous 
struggles at the church and the recreation hall, 
the 50 persons hiding in the little three-room 
maternity ward where her aunt had been a mid-
Chantal Kayisinga, whose family was killed at 
the maternity ward at Rukara Parish. 
Photo: USCRID. Hawk 
wife were easily massacred. From morning un-
til mid-day, the militia pulled many people out 
of the crowded rooms and hacked them with 
machetes. Her father, Sostain Musominare, a 
retired agricultural teacher, was cut on the knees 
and beaten to death. Of her immediate family 
members, only Chantal and her younger sister 
survived. 18 That Chantal survived is a miracle. 
When we interviewed her five months later, she 
was still at the hospital at Gahini. They had 
hacked her ankles with a machete, so she 
wouldn't be able to walk. Five months later, the 
deep, ugly cuts were still healing. Once she was 
on the ground, they beat her with a heavy club, 
and she lost consciousness. They slashed the 
back of her neck, obviously intending to finish 
her off. Five months later, she still had an inch-
deep wound in her neck several inches wide. 
Astonishingly, her spinal cord had not been sev-
ered. 
The experience of Mrs. Immaculate 
Mukamurigo, the 49-year-old nurse at the dis-
pensary, was quite different. She thinks that 
only on Wednesday had the decision been made 
that all the Thtsi at the parish had to be killed. 
At least up to then, that had not been clear to 
her. She had remained at the dispensary, tend-
ing the wounded, hiding in the dispensary toilet 
when the singing and whistling of the 
I nterhamwe warned her that they were again ap-
proaching the parish. Up to this point, when-
ever they came, people were wounded and 
killed. But then the militiamen would withdraw. 
And up to then, the Burgmeister, the local 
Member of Parliament, various police and sol-
diers would also- come to the parish and talk 
with the gathered Tutsi. Up to Wednesday, 
Aprill3, seven days after the killings in Rukara 
began, there were still numbers of Thtsi en-
sconced at the parish mission station. And there 
was still something of a stand-off between the 
Interhamwe and the resisting Tutsi in the main 
church building. 
Nurse Mukamurigo thinks that only 
then was there renewed determination in Rukara 
that all Tutsi at the parish had to be killed off 
completely. Her reason for thinking this is the 
heated debate that took place among 
lnterhamwe members in front of her and her 
son. He, like Angelique Umurungi, had been 
hiding among the dead and wounded at the rec-
reation hall. During that massacre, he had been 
found and recognized by fonner classmates who 
were now lnterhamwe. They pulled him out of 
the rec room, but whether or not it was to save 
him or to use him to find his mother was not yet 
clear. In any event, they took him to the dispen-
sary, which was at the other end of the mission 
station from the recreation hall, and had him call 
out to his mother, who was then hiding in a dis-
pensary toilet. When she recognized his voice, 
she came out of hiding. He was covered in 
blood, and at first sight she thought that her son 
was terribly wounded. But he assured her that 
he was all right. 
There then followed the bizarre argu-
ment between I nterhamwe members, in front of 
the mother and son, about whether these two 
Tutsi had to be killed. Some said it had to be 
done. They asked the son if they should kill 
him or his mother. The son replied that if that 
was their thinking, they should better kill them 
both. Other Interhamwe objected. "This 
woman has nursed us all our lives when we 
were sick," one explained. "What is the sin for 
which she must die?" he asked. Mrs. 
Mukamurigo 's defenders prevailed. They took 
her and her son back to her home. But her 
home had been destroyed. So they put her up 
with a kindly Hutu, Mr. Mbonye-Muvunyi, who 
agreed to shelter them.19 
Nurse Mukmurigo 's theory about the 
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recent decision that all the Tutsi at the parish 
had to be killed may be correct On Thursday, 
April 14, when Interhamwe returned to renew 
the attack against the Tutsi in the main church 
building, they brought with them a larger group 
of tetter anned soldiers, reportedly from 
Mirambi. The soldiers used their rifles to try to 
shoot through the metal door. A few bullets did 
penetrate the door, killing those who were hold-
ing the door in place from inside. But still the 
door held. They then tried to cut through the 
door with an ax. Fmally, the metal gave out, 
and the ax slashed through the door. But those 
inside grabbed the ax head from inside the door 
and pulled the ax into the church. They shoved 
a spear out the slash hole that had been created 
by the ax, nunming it through one of the sur-
prised attackers. The fighting grew even more 
desperate. 
Soldiers climbed on top of the roof and 
began shooting down through the roof into the 
area where the defenders were guarding the 
door. Now, the soldiers threw many grenades 
through the windows, and the defenders died in 
huge numbers. The soldiers finally pried away 
a section of metal roofing directly above the 
door, and began shooting down at those inside. 
The people in the church thought that finally 
they were finished. But the soldiers ran out of 
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ammunitio~ having blindly shot so many times 
into the door and through the roof.20 When the 
soldiers left around 2:00p.m., the militia with-
drew from the church, as well. 
On Friday, the lnterhamwe mob and the 
soldiers returned. But now, on Friday, April 15, 
the sounds of serious warfare between the gov-
ernment anny and the RPF were audible at 
Rukara parish. The Interhamwe now asked 
those inside to open the door and talk. Perhaps 
surprisingly, after some discussion, the Tutsi 
agreed to open the door. And while they were 
talking, other government troops came by to 
collect the soldiers that were at the parish with 
the locallnterhamwe mob so that the anny units 
could flee together to escape before the advanc-
ing troops of the RPF. At that point, deserted by 
the soldiers, the local militiamen threw their re-
maining stones. and spears at the church, and 
then ran away, too.21 
The massacre of Tutsi at the Rukara 
parish was over. When the RPF arrived the next 
day,22 they found bodies strewn about in front of 
the church buildings, and inside the various 
buildings. Many people were still hiding about 
Indeed, many of the SUIVivors were reluctant to 
come out, at first believing that the soldiers were 
from the government, coming to finish them off. 
According to the new, RPF-installed B~eister 
:for Rukara. Mr. Jean-Pierre Dusingizemungu, they 
did not have the capacity to prepare graves for 
the dead, so they brought soldiers from Gahini 
barracks, gathered the bodies into various piles, 
and cremated the decomposing corpses. 
The survivors inteiViewed in August-
September 1994 speak of two to three thou-
sand deaths at Rukara parish, with only about 
two hundred suiVivors, most of whom were 
among those still left alive inside the main 
church.23 Foreign journalists do have addi-
tional photographs of the bodies sprawled 
around the church grounds in late April. It 
would be possible to inteiView another score 
of suiVivors whose accounts could fill in 
more details of the events at Rukara parish. 
It should also be possible to obtain the confir-
mations of the foreign priests and nuns who 
were present during the beginning parts of 
the massacres. One would like even more to 
interrogate Burgmeister Jean Mpambara, who 
minimally would have a lot of explaining to 
do. But the outlines of what happened at 
Rukara are far beyond doubt. While some 
killings were done during the night, many 
were done in broad daylight by killers who 
knew their victims. There are many survi-
vors who easily and repeatedly can identify 
far more individual killers than are ever 
likely to be held responsible for their crimes. 
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The events at Rukara parish certainly 
conform to what a leading genocide scholar has 
recently characterized as the genocidal para-
digm: 
• There is a sustained attack, or continuity of 
attacks, by the perpetrator to physically de-
stroy group members. 
• The perpetrator is a collective or orga-
nized actor or a commander of orga-
nized actors. (Genocide is distinguish-
able from homicide empirically by the 
fact that it is never an act of a single in-
dividual.) 
• The victims are selected because they are 
members of a group. 
• The victims are defenseless or are killed re-
gardless of whether they surrendered or re-
sisted. 
• The destruction of group members is under-
taken with intent to kill and the murder is 
sanctioned by the perpetrators.24 
The course of events at Rukara parish 
exemplifies the findings of the UN Security 
Council's Commission of Experts for Rwanda 
that "mass extenninations of Tutsis were canied 
out by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned, 
systematic, and methodical way.''25 
At left, the Rukma parish door, with axe 
gashes, bullet holes, and blood stllins. Above, 
interior of church, where the roof was pried up 
to allow soldiers to shoot down at those inside. 
Photo: USCRID. Hawk 
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The refugees 
camped. in Zaire 
and Tanzania are 
controlled by the 
same political lead-
ers and forces now 
in those camps who 
perpetrated the 
genocide. 
DI. POSTSCRIPT: PROBLEMS OF 
PREVENTION, REMEDY, AND RE-
DRESS 
In 1948, the United Nations promulgated the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention was 
fmmulated in response to the opinion of the 
judges at the post-World War IT Nuremberg tri-
bunals that tenible crimes against humanity not 
committed in time of war were not previously 
illegal under international law. The Genocide 
Convention defines "acts of genocide" and 
"crimes of genocide." The Convention requires 
that signatory States incorporate laws on the 
prevention and punishment of genocide into 
their domestic criminal codes. 111e Convention 
establishes a potential avenue for the prevention 
or suppression of genocide, and it posits the le-
gal obligation that those responsible for com-
mitting genocide should be brought to justice 
and punished either in the state in which the 
crime occurred, or in a competent international 
penal tribunal. 
Non-Prevention and Non-Suppression in 
Rwanda · 
Under Article VIll of the Genocide Convention, 
the procedure for preventing or suppressing 
genocide is that ''Any Contracting Party may 
call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations to take such action under the Charter of 
the United Nations as they consider appropriate:' 
Even before the mgent need in April 
1994 for concerted international action to halt 
the Rwandan genocide, the situation in Rwanda 
was already a matter of concern in the UN Se-
cwity Council, the UN's most "competent or-
gan." The Council had already dispatched peace-
keeping foireS known as the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda, I(UNAMIR) to 
oversee the implementation of the 1992 interna-
tionally brokered "Arusha" pear..e accord be-
tween the Rwandan government and the rebel 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)26 
However, rather than building on the 
established UNAMIR presence to "prevent or 
suppress" the genocide, the chain of events in 
Rwanda that accompanied the outbreak of the 
post-April 6 massacres also led to UNAMIR 'sZ7 
breakdown and its almost complete withdrawal 
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from Rwanda 28 Tragically, the fifteen UN 
Member States on the Security Council failed to 
redefine, rebuild, or redeploy a UN peacekeep-
ing presence to make a necessary "show of 
force" that could have saved tens of thousands 
of lives by detening government-instigated 
mobs from carrying out many of the massa-
cres.29 
Thus, it was not concerted international 
action that deterred or suppressed massacres in 
Rwanda; rather, it was the military victory of the 
RPF in the renewed warfare after the breakdown 
of the cease fire and the mass killings by sup-
porters of the old government that followed 
President Habyarimanas fatal plane crash. The 
RPF victory led to one of the largest refugee 
flows ever recorded. Leaders of the defeated 
government took roughly two million Hutu 
Rwandans with them into regionally destabiliz-
ing exile in neighboring Tanzania and Zaire. 
Widely televised images of death and disease in 
refugee camps sparked the massive international 
humanitarian intervention that had been so 
tragically absent from the victims and survivors 
in Rwanda itself. But despite a continuing inter-
national presence, the refugees camped in Zqire 
and Tanzania are controlled by the same politi-
cal leaders and forces now in those camps who 
perpetrated the genocide, and who today use the 
refugees, and the prospect of their repatriation 
to Rwanda, as a bargaining chip in a quest for 
amnesty and a return to political power. These 
factors set the international political context for 
dealing with the aftennath of the Rwandan 
genocide. 
Breaking the Cycles of Impunity and 
Deterring Revenge 
For literally a generation, from the 1959-60 
revolution that brought the Hutu to power and 
led to the initial, partial expulsion of Tutsi to 
Uganda, Burundi, and elsewhere, elements of 
the Hutu majority population, with complete 
and total impunity, periodically massacred 
members of the Tutsi minority group who re-
mained in Rwanda No one was ever brought to 
justice or punished for these killings. There 
were no sanctions, or even the idea that there 
should be sanctions, against such murders. This 
key factor, cited by UN reports and many 
Rwandans alike, enabled the Rwandan genocide. 
Thus, in April 1994, when a crisis ex-
ploded over the unwillingness of the governing 
Hutu political parties to implement the power-
sharing provisions of the Arusha peace accords, 
and when the decisions were made and imple-
mented to physically eliminate the Tutsi minor-
ity group, as such, the killings were done in 
broad daylight. The killers made no attempt to 
disguise or hide their identity. These were ethni-
cally motivated murders, not punislnnents for mur-
der. These were murders sanctioned by state and 
political authorities, who indeed had gone to great 
lengths to organize, prepare, and motivate elements 
of the population to take these actions. 
The new Rwandan government argues, 
with compelling logic and passion, that there is 
one way to deter future ethnically motivated po-
litical killings: end the generation-long pattern 
of such killings by holding accountable and 
bringing to justice those responsible for criminal 
acts under international and Rwandan domestic 
law. The Rwandan government also argues that 
only legal action against those responsible for 
these murders can deter aggrieved Rwandan 
citizens, including members of the new 
Rwandan armed forces, from taking the law into 
their 0\\>11 hands in the form of revenge killings. 30 
UN officials working to create an inter-
national tribunal also emphasize the centrality 
of establishing the principle of accountability 
for grave violations of international humanitar-
ian law, including genocide, as a deterrent to fu-
ture violations. Acts of genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity have all been com-
mitted since the founding of the UN and the 
signing of the Genocide Convention. Despite 
that fact, no international criminal proceedings 
have occurred since the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials following World War II. The Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide has never been used or imple-
mented to bring to justice those responsible for 
these crimes. Up to the present in real life, the 
Convention remains morib.md. Thus, the world 
has no measure of the extent to which international 
prosecutions would acUlally deter future political 
authorities from resolving their internal political 
difficulties through the attempted destruction of un-
wanted, despised or problematic ethnic, racial, reli-
gious or national groups. On the other hand, the 
converse is perfectly obvious: the suspension or 
non-application of legal principles and procedures 
to hold accountable those who have committed 
such crimes is no deterrent whatsoever. 
It is hard to imagine a situation where 
acts of genocide will be so massive, clear, and 
both legally and politically unambiguous as 
they were in Rwanda The international com-
munity failed to prevent or suppress the 
Rwandan genocide while it was ~going on. If it 
fails now to hold accountable and bring to jus-
tice those responsible for the genocide, the 
grave ramifications will reach far beyond the 
situation in Rwanda 
Genocide is an international crime that 
should, by its own definition, be punished under 
international law. Beyond that, there are three 
reasons why it important for Rwanda that inter-
national proceedings be initiated for the crimes 
committed there, in addition to any criminal 
proceedings that might take place at the national 
level in a rebuilt Rwandan judicial system. 
First, ending the cycles of impunity--without 
which a genuine process of national reconcilia-
tion will be unlikely--requires that the ethnic 
majority in Rwanda not perceive the punish-
ment of those responsible for the former 
government's mass murder of ethnic minorities 
as "victor's justice" or state-sponsored revenge. 
"World-sanctioned," not "Rwandan-victors" jus-
tice will result if an international community tri-
bunal determines that genocide and other ter-
rible crimes were committed and prosecutes 
those most responsible. By the same token, the 
new government and the Tutsi minority at the 
grass roots level need to know that in the eyes of 
the world and in the conscience of mankind, ter-
rible crimes were committed in Rwanda and 
that those who committed them will be indicted 
and prosecuted by an international tribunal. 
Second, the fonner Rwandan govern-
ment officials most responsible for the geno-
cidal acts and crimes against humanity commit-
ted in Rwanda have fled the country and remain 
outside the tenitocy and jurisdiction of the 
Rwanda state, beyond the reach of Rwandan 
law. The countries in which those most respon-
sible now reside will more likely respond to, 
and cooperate with, an international tribunal 
convened under the jurisdiction of the UN Secu-
rity Council, than to Rwandan national courts. 
Thus, it is more likely that an international tribu-
nal can successfully indict and prosecute those 
who planned, organized, and ordered the massa-
cres. Operating in isolation, Rwandan law will 
only reach, and a reconstituted Rwandan justice 
" ... only legal action 
against those re-
sponsible for these 
murders can deter 
aggrieved Rwandan 
citizens, including 
members of the new 
Rwandan armed 
forces,from taking 
the law into their 
own hands ••. " 
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Operating in 
isolation, 
Rwandan law will 
only reach ... those 
who did not flee, 
and those who are 
at the very bottom 
of the former 
govemmenfs 
murderous chain 
of command. 
system will only prosecute, those who did not 
flee, and those who are at the very bottom of the 
fonner government's murderous chain of com-
mand: the pathetic small fry--some confessing 
guilt, ~orne protesting innocence--now under de-
tention in Rwandan jails. 
Third, it is probably easier and faster to 
conver te an international tribunal than to rebuild 
the R' vandan judicial system under prevailing 
conditions in Rwanda 
Ajchieving Accountability 
Two major impediments hinder efforts to bring 
to justice those responsible for the Rwandan 
genoci :le. First, the international and national 
courts necessary to initiate legal proceedings do 
not ye1: exist and have to be created or re-cre-
ated. Second, is the sheer nmnber of partici-
pants in the killings-as noted above, far more 
than ca G possibly be brought fully to justice under 
any cor teeivable circumstances. Thus, if, or when, 
an inte1 national criminal tritxmal is convened and 
if, or when, the Rwandan judicial system is recon-
stituted and reb.rilt, coordinated judgments must be 
made 2 bout priorities for prosecution at both the 
nationa: l and international levels. 
Steps Toward Convening an International 
Tribunal 
In contrast to the UN Security Council's floun-
dering ; nability to prevent, deter, or suppress the 
Rwand;m genocide while the massacres were 
taking :place, the UN Security Council actions 
n1ost essential for creating an international tribu-
nal for grave violations of intemaljonal humani-
tarian l:tw in Rwanda are moving forward. But 
they at1 ~ enveloped by other critical and long-
overdu~: UN human rights monitoring efforts in 
Rwand;t that remain mired in intra-UN bureau-
cratic confusion and delay. 
On June 28, a 19-page report31 by a UN 
Cmnmi ssion on Human Rights-appointed "Spe-
cial Rapporteur," Mr. R. Degni-Segui,32 exam-
ined the nature of the human rights violations in 
Rwand(t with specific reference to the provi-
sions of the Genocide Convention. Degni-Segui 
concluded that acts of genocide had been com-
mitted in Rwanda, along with additional viola-
tions of human rights conventions that are 
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"binding on the Rwandan State" and other grave 
violations of international humanitarian law. 
The report recommended the establishment of a 
reinforced team of human rights observers in 
Rwanda, and that: 
Pending the establishment of a permanenJ 
international criminal cow-t, the United 
Nations sJwuld establish an ad hoc inter-
national tribwzal to hear the evidence and 
judge the guilty parties or, alternatively, 
should extend the jurisdiction of the inJer-
national tribwzal on war crimes committed 
in the former Yugoslavia. 33 
Only the UN Security Council itself, 
acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, can 
establish an international tribunal whose deter-
minations are binding on all UN Member States. 
Immediately after the Spxial ~rteur's Re-
ports were published, on July 1, 1994, the Secu-
rity Council passed Resolution 935 urging the 
UN Secretary-General to appoint an impartial 
Commission of Experts on Rwanda The action 
followed a precedent established when the UN 
created an ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia. The Commission was charged with ex-
amining the facts and legalities of the Rwandan 
situation, and to provide the Secretary Genernl. 
with its conclusions regarding the evidence and 
perpetration of grave violations of international hu-
manitarian law, including genocide. 
The Secretary-General's Report to the 
Security Council of July 26,34 which appointed 
the Expert Commissioners (Mr. Atsu-Koffi 
Amega, a former President of the Supreme 
Court of Togo; Mrs. Habi Dieng, a former At-
torney General of Guinea; and Mr. Salifu 
Fomba, a law professor in Mali who is a mem-
ber of the UN International Law Commission) 
further mandated the Commission of Experts to 
review and update infonnation available from 
all sources, carry out its own investigations in 
Rwanda, draw its own conclusions on the evi-
dence of violations of international hwnanitarian 
law including genocide, and determine whether 
and to what extent individuals may be held re-
sponsible for having committed such violations. 
The Commission of Experts convened 
in Geneva and began its work in mid-August 
Its final report is to be submitted by November 
30. The Commission of Experts urgently issued 
a preliminary report on September 29, to facili-
tate earlier Security Council consideration of es-
tablishing a oibunal for Rwanda The Commis-
sioners reviewed a wide variety of reporting, 
from the Special Rapporteur, UN Member 
States, UN agencies, other intergovernmental 
bodies, NGOs, 35 and from both sides in the 
armed conflict. The Commissioners visited 
Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania from late August 
to mid-September, prior to the September 29 
publication of its Preliminary Report. 
The 35-page Preliminary Report dis-
cussed the "concerted, planned, systematic and 
methodical nature of the criminal acts," commit-
ted by the Rwandan Government soldiers and 
Hutu militia against the Tutsi of Rwanda 36 
(The Commission of Experts Preliminary Re-
port has a one sentence notation of the massacre 
at Rukara, described in some detail above in this 
USCR investigation. 37) The Report also states 
that grounds exist for concluding that Tutsi ele-
ments committed acts against Hutu individuals 
that, while not amounting to genocide, included 
assassinations, summary executions, breaches of 
international humanitarian law, and crimes 
against humanity. 38 The Commission noted that 
it had just received reports of Rwanda Patriotic 
Front violations of the right to life committed 
during August and September 1994, and that the 
Secretary General had asked the Commission to 
further investigate these reports. 39 
The Preliminary Report devoted eleven 
pages to an analysis of individual responsibility 
in international law as applied to the situation in 
Rwanda: particularly violations of Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
the 1977 additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions relating to violations against the ci-
vilian JX>pulation in time of armed conflict; crimes 
against humanity; and geoocide. Regarding geno-
cide, the Preliminary Report noted that, 
The Commission of Expens has deter-
mined tluzt there are ample grounds to con-
clude that every provision laid out in Ar-
ticle III of the Genocide Convention 
[genocide crimes include the killings them-
selves; conspiracy to commit genocide; in-
citement to commit genocide, the attempt 
to commit genocide, and complicity in 
genocide] have been violated in Rwanda in 
the period 6 April to 15 1 uly in respect of a 
specific ethnic group as such.40 
The Report considers the relative merits 
of "municipal" prosecutions, i.e. Rwandan 
courts for international crimes, versus interna-
tional prosecutions for international crimes. It 
finds that international prosecutions are prefer-
able, citing independence, objectivity, and im-
partiality and the perception (both in Rwanda 
and abroad) that convictions will have been 
fairly reached. The Commissioners also 
stressed that the gravity of the Rwandan viola-
tions extend beyond Rwanda, and that as a mat-
ter of peace and security affecting the interna-
tional community as a whole, 
the developmen! of international criminal 
law to better deter such crimes from being 
perpetrated in the future not only in 
Rwanda, but anywhere, would be best fos-
tered by international prosecution rather 
than by domestic courts.41 
The Commission of Experts strongly 
recommends to the Security Council that it 
take all necessary and effective action to 
ensure that the individuals responsible for 
the serious violations of human rights in 
Rwanda during the armed conflict trig-
gered on 6 April 1994 are brought to jus-
tice before an independent and impartial 
international criminal tribuna/." 42 
The Commission of Experts offers 
three reasons for expanding the competence and 
jurisdiction of the recently created International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to handle 
prosecution of Rwandan cases, rather than to 
create a separate ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda:43 
(1) administrative efficiency, (2) the deterrent 
value of the development of international crimi-
nal justice, and (3) the consistency of intetpreta-
tion and application of international law. On 
this matter, the Commission of Experts for 
Rwanda concurs with concerns raised by the 
United States. From the time of the UN's 
founding up to just a year ago when the 
Yugoslav Tribunal was created, the UN had not 
been able to bring into being an international 
criminal tribunal as part of the international or-
der. Thus, no experience or precedents exists 
for deteiiDining how to conduct such trials or 
how to intetpret or apply various international 
laws. If two separate, independent tribunals 
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were 1:0 come into operation siinultaneously, a 
considerable risk exists 1that different 
prosec utorial standards and procedures and dif-
fering interpretation and applications of interna-
tional law would result from two unrelated sets 
of pro:;ecutors and judges. 
There are other practical matters. The 
Comrnission of Experts for Yugoslavia took 
nearly two years to figure out the structure and 
rules of procedure that detennine how such a 
criminal court would work. Appointing judges 
and finding a chief Prosecutor was another 
lengthy UN process. But these elements are 
now irt place. The Dutch govennment has pro-
vided court rooms in the Hague and built a 
prison for the Yugoslav tribunal. A separate tri-
bunal ;br Rwanda would duplicate these efforts, 
at coru;iderable time and expense.44 Even while 
1the Commission of Experts for Rwanda recom-
mends that the Yugoslav Tribunal, about to get 
underway in Holland, be expanded to handle 
R wanclan cases as well, the Commission notes 
that, e~ren if the legal framework, structure, and 
persont1el of the Yugoslav tribunal are used for 
R wanC.a, the competence and jurisdiction of the 
triburuJl are a different issue from the site where 
trials c:>uld be held. While this would be a mat-
ter for the Court itself to decide, if and when the 
Securi1y Council creates such a tribunal, the 
Commission of Experts explicitly notes that 
no inconsistency would in any way exist 
between having cases brought under the 
jurisdiction of an international criminal 
tril. 'una/ and between having the trials con-
ducted by this tribunal in the territory of 
Rwanda .... " 45 
A very strong case can be made that 
some trials should be conducted and verdicts 
announced in Rwanda However, reportedly, it 
may be the case that elements of the new 
Rwandan government prefer that a completely 
separat~ tribunal be brought into being and lo-
cated entirely within Rwanda 46 (Elements of 
the Rwandan government may also have reser-
vations about the projected time frame for the ju-
risdicticn of an international t:ribma. Rwanda 
continues to sit on the Security Council of the 
UN, wllere the decisions on these matters will 
be maC.e (as the fonner government did when 
the UN was stymied in its respon.r)(! to the geno-
cide lfu.t was occurring.) 
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Meanwhile, the Commission of Experts 
is continuing to investigate the Rwandan viola-
tions, in preparation of its final report of No-
vember 30. That report will be a much more 
thorough factual and legal analysis than was 
possible for the September 29 Preliminary Re-
port At least a dozen persons seconded to the 
Commission of Experts from UN Member States 
are now conducting investigations inside Rwanda. 
In early September, as a pennanent 
member of the Security Council, the United 
States began circulating draft amendments to 
the Statutes of the Tribunal for the fonner Yugo-
slavia (which the Security Council had ap-
proved in Resolutions 808 and 827). It also cir-
culated a draft resolution on Rwanda that would 
enable the international prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the terri-
tory of Rwanda, or by Rwandans in the territory 
of neighboring States, since April 1, 1994. That 
resolution would allow the Secretary General to 
arrange urgently for a prosecutorial staff for the 
Rwandan cases and to prepare for the election 
of additional judges. The draft resolution urges 
Member States and intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations to contribute funds, 
equipment, and services the International Triru-
nal. And the draft resolution \VOuld "decide;' under 
the UN's Olapter 7 powers, that States 
shall cooperate fully with the International 
Tribunal ... and take any measure necessary 
under their domestic law to implement the 
provisions of the present resolution and the 
Statute. 
This important provision fairly man-
dates the States to which those individuals most 
responsible for the Rwandan genocide have fled 
to cooperate with the Tribunal in arresting and 
extraditing indicted suspects. 
If the Security Council does choose to 
expand the tribunal previously created for 
Yugoslavia, whose structure and rules of proce-
dure already exists, it is possible to envision 
how the process would work for Rwanda The 
Yugoslav Tribunal has two trial chambers of 
three judges each, an appeals chamber with five 
judges, a court staff called the "registry," and a 
prosecutorial staff headed by a Chief Prosecutor 
and Deputy Prosecutor that would operate fairly 
independently of the judges. The U.S. proposal 
would add an additional two trial chambers with 
another three judges each. The UN General As-
sembly elects the judges based on the candi-
dates suggested by the Security Council. The 
Prosecutorial staff, the Court Registry, and the 
Tribunal budge~7 would be enlarged to handle 
the tribunal's caseload. Because the Rwandan 
cases derive from Francophone Africa, geo-
graphic balance, regional representation, and ap-
propriate language and legal qualifications 
would be factors in adding judges and 
prosecutorial staff. The United States has pro-
posed slight alterations in the Tribunal's legal 
mandate to ensure that the Courts' handling of 
war crirnes and crimes against humanity take 
into account the Rwandan situation. 
If the mandate of the former Yugoslavia 
tribunal is expanded, international legal pro-
ceedings against the perpetrators of the Rwanda 
genocide could begin fairly quickly.48 Consulta-
tions could begin right away between the inter-
national Prosecutor's office and Rwandan au-
thorities regarding the priority targets for 
criminal indictments and the ca.'Cs of prisoners 
presend y detained iil Rwandan prisons. 
More importan~ the process could be-
gin for indicting those former higher-echelon 
Rwandan officials who led the massacres, and 
the highest level political leaders who planned 
and ordered the killings but who fled Rwanda, 
and who now reside outside Rwanda's territory 
and jurisdiction. If the Judges of the Interna-
tional Tribunal concur with the September 29 
Repo:rt49 of the Commission of Experts for 
Rwanda that not only were acts of genocide 
committed in Rwanda, but also that provisions 
prohibiting conspiracy to commit genocide, 
public incitement to commit genocide, the at-
tempt to commit genocide, and complicity in 
genocide were all violated as well in Rwanda 
between April 6 and July 15 in respect to a spe-
cific ethnic group, then the international tribunal 
would be able to indict for "conspiracy" to 
commit genocide the political leaders who 
planned the massacres and gave the orders to 
carry out the massacres. The directors and 
.broadcasters of Radio Mille Collenes, which 
broadcast admonitions to the public to fill the 
The massacre at Gahini. Photo: Father Oswald Rudakemwa 
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graves, should be indictable. for "incitement" to 
commit genocide. And the leaders of the 
I nterkvnwe mobs that wielded the machetes 
and clubs should be indictable for the "attempt" 
to carr. mit genocide. 
The President of the Yugoslav Tribunal 
has already explained how the itndictment pro-
cess '"·auld work. 50 First, the Chief Prosecutor 
prepar~~s an indicnnent. Second, a judge from 
one of the Trial Chambers confirms the indict-
ment 'nd issues an arrest warrant. (The details 
of every indicnnent will be made public). 
Third, the arrest warrant will•be sent to the State 
in wh[ch the accused was last known to be 
present. (That State is required to notify the Tri-
bunal if it is unable to execute the warrant.) 
Fourth, if the state fails to execute the warrant 
promptly, the Tribunal will attempt to inform 
the accused of the indicnnent by putting notices 
in appropriate newspapers. Fifth, if at that 
point, the accused person still does not come 
into th~ custody of the Tribunal, the indicnnent 
and aTI of its supporting evidence will be sub-
mitted in full to one of the three judge Trial 
Chambers. If the Judges determine that a prima 
facie case exists, an international arrest warrant 
will be issued to all member states. 
The Tribunal is to report to the Security 
Council if the noncooperation of a Member 
State binders an arrest warrant. The Security 
Council has already prepared the groundwork 
for po: ;sible sanctions against noncooperating 
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states, which could be important if Zaire, for ex-
ample, would not cooperate in arresting poten-
tially indicted persons residing in the huge 
Rwandan refugee camps there. 
Thus, whHe the Tribunal will not con-
duct trials in absentia, international 
criminalization can occur,in effect, even if the 
indicted persons cannot be tried. According to 
the President of the Tribunal: 
... the steps we have included, and which we 
are prepared to implement, will go a long 
way towards bringing those persons to 
justice or effectively imprisoning them 
within the borders of a State which will be 
regarded as a pariah among nations.51 
Obviously, many steps are necessary to reach 
this endpoint 
* * * 
In reviewing the problems and prospects 
for the war crimes Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via, Helsinki Watch concluded, 
The international corrununity has lacked 
the will to bring about a cessation of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in 
Croatia and Bosnia; the least it can do is 
to bring the criminals to justice.52 
The same can certainly be said about Rwanda, 
as well. 
topography, Rwanda is known as the "land of a thousand 
hills." The Rwandan c:apital of Kigali is rather like an 
tmbuilt-up San Francisco, an tmdulating cluster of steep 
hills. 
s Musonera is short (roughly 5' 5") and has a rounded 
nose. In legend and mythology, and to a lesser extent in 
reality, the archetypical Tutsi is tall and slender, with an 
aquiline or long nose, while supposedly Hutu are short, 
stocky, and with a flat or more rmmded nose. In reality, 
ethnic designation in Rwanda is as much a ftmction of 
"class" as it is "tribe." Many Rwandans cannot be recog-
nized as either Huru or Tutsi, which is why the govern-
ment retained the use of '"tribal specific" identity cards. 
6 Formally, lmpusamugambii "those who have the same 
goal," or /nJerhaJnwe, "those who act together," were the 
''youth wing" or "militia"' of President Habyarimana' s po-
litical party, the National Revolutionary Movement for 
Democracy and Development (MRND). They were gen-
erally tmeducated, lDlemployed or semi-employed yolDlg 
men, armed by the extremist parties, around a core of 
poorly paid local thugs. The normal use of the word "mi-
litia" connotes far too much organization. discipline, or 
training for these young men. lnterhamwe has also ac-
quired generic usage as a ''Tutsi-attacking mob." 
Throughout this report, the terms "lnterhamwe," "mili-
tia," and "mob" refer to this MRND "youth wing." The 
/nterhamwe had two bosses, the Presidential Guard 
(when they were around) or local political leaders. It is 
clear from the descriptions of the survivors that the 
/nterhamwe functioned like mobs. Ten armed UN sol-
diers posted as guards at either of these sites could surely 
have stopped the killing entirely. These vagabond teen-
agers with machetes and clubs would not have challenged 
uniformed men with blue hats and guns. 
7 Survivors interviewed in both of the case studies pre-
sented in this report gave several reasons for staying in-
side the parish grounds and buildings, even when they 
knew they would be attacked. First, the streets and roads 
outside were even more dangerous. With or without 
Tutsi ID cards, they would have surely been killed out-
side the churches. They cited, as well, their hope for 
safety in numbers, and thought that their best hope lay in 
remaining inside the parish property, on holy ground and 
with foreign priests to protect them. 
8 See footnote 4. 
9 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), which had been earlier sent to Rwanda by 
the UN Security Council to observe the implementation 
of the Arusha peace accord between the Rwandan gov-
ernment and the rebel force known as the Rwandan Patri-
otic Front (RPF). Major Ryszard subsequently returned 
to Poland. This account is from the testimony of Major 
Maczka, who remains on duty with UNAMIR. 
10 The only discrepancy between Musonera's account 
and those of the two foreign observers cited here is in the 
numbers of participants in these events, both with respect 
to victims and perpetrators. 
11 The original negatives were sent back to Poland for 
processing. The only pictures mailed to Kigali were 
given to UN human rights officials who took them to 
Geneva for duplication. 
12 
"Commune" is the Rwandan administrative equivalent 
of a "county" in the United States. 
13 
'Prefecture" is the Rwandan administrative equivalent 
of a "state" in the United States. 
14 According to Kabarira, this group of militiamen was 
led by Francois Nyirahuku, a teacher and local president 
of the extremist CDR party; Mr. Rukundo, headmaster of 
a local primary school; Paul Mujambere, a carpenter; Mr. 
Magoro, the Responsible of Kinunga cell; Mr. Nkurayiga, 
an accountant at the Rukara Commune office; and a peas-
ant farmer known as Munyagihe. 
15 USCR did not ask how the survivors actually knew 
that the militiamen ate steak and roast beef for two days. 
The more salient fact is that, after killing eleven and driv-
ing off the cattle, the mob did not rerum for two days to 
continue the killings. 
16 According to Sister V eneranda, important parishioners 
who led the /nterhamwe attacks at the church included: 
Jean Tpaumbara, Jean Bosco Rukundo, Mr. Ruribunmdi, 
Mr. Ngbonziza, Paul Thujyambere, Francois Nyiraluku. 
Jean Claud Nkuruyija, Mr. Gasaugura, Jean Gihana, and 
M. Ruabikinza. 
17 A gaping hold on the side of the metal door frame was 
plainly visible when, after hearing Ms. Umurungi' s testi-
mony, the USCR mission made its second visit to Rukara 
Parish. 
18 Other immediate family members killed at the mater-
nity ward include Berthe Mukaysinga, Odette 
Musantiwabo, Jean Marie Vjamney Hodari, Liliose 
Mwentekati, Uwimana, Umutone, Bizimana, Bamuyesi, 
andGatesi. 
!9 Mr. Mbonye-Muvunyi, nonetheless, fled to Tanzania. 
along with most of the area Hutu after the RPF took over 
in Rukara. While he had not killed, his sons had been 
/nterhamwe, and he was afraid that the RPF would kill 
him too, according to Nurse Mukamurigo. 
20 After hearing Andrew Kabarira's testimony, the USCR 
mission returned to the church and witnessed the bullet 
holes in the roof, the ripped off sheet roofing, and the 
gash in the metal door. 
21 Some of them may not have gotten too far. Just after 
the RPF takeover at Rukara. when foreign jomnalists (in-
cluding a Kampala-based, free-lance journalist who has 
written a number of reports for USCR) came to the par-
ish, among the dead bodies strewn about the parish was a 
noticeable pile of short young men whose anns had been 
tied behind their backs. None of the Tutsi survivors at 
Rukara interviewed by USCR in August-September de-
scribed killings in that fashion. 
22 When the killings in Rukara began, nine days earlier, 
according to the new RPF leaders for Rukara comnume, the 
RPF troops were more than one hundred kilometers away. 
23 Without identifying its source of information, the Sep-
tember 29 Preliminary Report of the UN Commission of 
Experts cites the massacre of 500 Tutsi at the Catholic 
mission at Rukara (para. 63, p. 15). All of the Rukara 
survivors USCR interviewed (independy of each other) 
mentioned either two or three thousand deaths. 
24 Helen Fein, "Discriminating Genocide from War 
Crimes," Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy, Vol. 22, No.1, Fall1993. 
~ Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of 
Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council 
Resolution 935, September29, 1994, p. 10. 
26 See U.S. Committee for Refugees Issue Paper, "Exile 
from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion," February 
1991. 
A Genocide in Rwanda 
27 Caused in large part by the withdrawal of the Belgian 
contingent following the deaths of ten Belgian peace-
keepers who were with Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana, who had been deliberately and person-
ally targeted for immediate execution--a situation that 
differed substantially from the mass killings of etlmic mi-
nority group by the poorly armed government-organized 
mobs that followed for the next several weeks. 
28 Ironically, one of the difficulties was that, at the same 
time, the Rwandan government, which was committing 
the genocide, was itself one of the revolving, nonperma-
nent members of the Security Council, and continued to 
participate in UN deliberations over what to do about 
Rwanda Another difficulty was the initial misperceptions in 
some UN policy circles that what was happening was com-
munal violence resulting from an explosion of ancient 
tribal hatreds, rather than a governmentally planned and 
directed mass murder designed to retain political power. 
Another complicating factor, given present U.S. predomi-
nance in the Security Council, was the coincidental ar-
rival at the UN of the Presidential Decision 25, a well-
considered U.S. (Somalia experience-driven) policy 
memoranda designed to bring about better, more careful, 
long-term planning for more effective UN peacekeeping 
operations, but which arrived at the very moment when 
what was even more efficacious was decisive action in 
the face of messy, fast-moving events in Rwanda. 
29 Unlike other peacekeeping operations elsewhere, in 
Rwanda, the UN peacekeeping troops were not them-
selves targeted. The few instances where a handful of the 
remaining UNAMIR forces did maintain a presence at 
sites where large numbers of Tutsi had· sought refuge, the 
militia backed off and did not attack. 
30 The new government is arresting some Tutsi who have 
engaged in revenge killings by private citizens. One such 
person was interviewed in Kibungo by the USCR mis-
sion. There are also now additional allegations of re-
venge killings by RPF forces. (The USCR mission saw 
imprisoned RPF soldiers, but did not learn what they are 
charged with.) 
31 UN Doc. #E/CN. 4/1995n. Excerpts from this report 
were published as a News Bulletin by USCR on July 12, 
1994. 
32 The Commission on Human Rights is a Geneva-based 
UN political body, comprised of 53 UN Member States, 
which reports to the Economic and Social Council, a sub-
sidiary body of the UN General Assembly. The staff Sec-
retariat of the Commission, the UN Human Rights Cen-
ter, and its agents (generally referred to as "Special 
Rapporteurs" or "Special Representatives'') can only con-
duct investigations of, or prepare reports about, human 
rights violations when explicitly enabled so to do by a 
resolution of the Commission, passed by a majority of its 
members voting under instructions of their respective 
governments. Normally, the Commission meets for only 
six weeks a year in February-March. To obtain the nec-
essary mandate for the UN investigation a special session 
of the Human Rights Commission, its third ever, was 
convened on May 25. 
A Genocide in Rwanda 
33 Paragraph 75, page 19. 
34 UN Doc. S/1994!879 
3S Including the U.S. Commiuee for Refugees. 
36 Item B, pages 10-17. 
n Paragraph 63, page 15. 
38 Paragraph 82, page 17. 
39 Paragraph 83, pages 17-18. 
-«~ Paragraph 115, page 28. Also Paragraphs 137-139, 
page34. 
41 Paragraph 129, page 32. 
42 Paragraph 141, page 34. 
43 Pages 31-32. 
44 It is also very much on the minds of UN legal officials 
that the expansion of the competence of the Yugoslavia 
tribt.m.al is a large step toward the Security Council creat-
ing a possible ongoing international tribunal with vastly 
wider jurisdiction than would likely be accomplished 
through the process of creating a pennanent international 
tribunal through the treaty ratification by UN Member 
States, a process that would allow many States to severely 
restrict and delimit the jurisdiction of any such tribunal. 
45 Paragraph 126, page 31. 
46 SeeNew York Times, October 7, Page 19. 
47 Importantly, nongovernmental organizations are ex-
plicitly enabled to submit evidence to the Prosecutors. 
NGOs can be called upon to testify. NGOs can also sub-
mit amicus curiae briefs to the Court at the Trial and ap-
peal stages. 
48 The International Tribtmal would be funded, upon ap-
proval of the budget by the General Assembly, as an inte-
gral part of the UN system. 
49 Op.Cit., paragraphs 114 and 115, p. 28. 
so "Statement by the President Made at a Briefing to 
Members of Diplomatic Missions," International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Febru-
ary 11, 1994, The Hague, Netherlands, UN Doc. IT /29, p. 8. 
Sl Ibid., p. 9. 
52 Jeri Laber and Ivana Nizich, 'The War Crimes Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia: Problems and Prospects," 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, Sum-
mer/Fall1994, p. 16. 


